$15M
Target fund size Proposed
Thesis & Fund I
A proposed $15M first fund for Pakistani software.
Twenty years of exported engineering, priced at an hourly rate. The next decade belongs to teams that keep the equity.
The argument
Sell the product, not the hour.
One observation drives everything else: the engineering capacity is proven, the ownership of its output is not.
Pakistan exports billions a year, almost all services. Linear revenue, capped by headcount, priced against the cheapest bench on earth. It builds skill without building assets.
Product revenue compounds, carries a multiple, and accrues to owners rather than billers. The bench already exists. The first institutional cheque does not.
| Dimension | Services | Product |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue shape | Linear with headcount | Compounds |
| Gross margin | 25–40% | 70–85% |
| Priced against | The cheapest bench available | The value delivered |
| Who owns the upside | The client | The founders |
| Exit multiple | Low single digit | Revenue multiple |
Hours
Product
Margin
Equity
Underwriting
Five questions we have to answer yes to.
The test stops us funding a good team with no path to a second cheque. One no is usually a no overall.
| Proof | The question |
|---|---|
| Hard currency | Is there a credible buyer paying in dollars, pounds or dirhams within twelve months? |
| Unfair build | Does building from Pakistan make this materially cheaper or faster, rather than merely possible? |
| Reachable buyer | Can this team reach the buyer without a sales office in the buyer's city? |
| Narrow wedge | Is the first version small enough to ship in weeks and specific enough to be chosen? |
| Structural clarity | Can the company be held, funded and eventually acquired through a structure a foreign investor recognises? |
Proposed Fund I
Small, concentrated, and early.
The fund we are building toward. None of it is committed capital.
$50–250K
First cheque Proposed
20–25
Companies over the fund life Proposed
40%
Reserved for follow-on Proposed
We lead or co-lead the first round, take an information right rather than a board seat, and reserve more than we first invest. Ownership targets follow from that construction, not from a rule we apply to founders.
Risks
What would make this thesis wrong.
Better stated here than asked in a first meeting.
Currency and transfer risk
Rupee volatility and repatriation friction hit valuations and exits. Offshore holding structures mitigate it; nothing removes it.
A thin follow-on market
If Series A investors stay away, our companies stall at a stage we cannot fund alone. Reserves and early co-investor relationships are the answer.
Talent leaving
The engineers we back get recruited abroad at multiples of local pay. Equity has to be real and vesting honest.
Perception discount
Some buyers discount the country regardless of the company. Product quality and reference customers are the only durable rebuttal.
Policy and connectivity
Internet disruption and regulatory change are real operating risks for a software company here.
Too few fundable teams
The thesis needs enough product-minded founders each year to fill a portfolio. If that number is smaller than we believe, the fund is the wrong size.
Does your company pass the five?
Answer all five and we want the conversation. Answer four and we still do — tell us which one is missing.